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Book Reviews
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: A Bibliography. Compiled
by Fannie J. Klein. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1963. Pp.
xxxii, 650. $30.00.
This book published for the American Judicature Society and the Institute of
Judicial Administration is a useful guide to provide informative access to the
literature on judicial administration and the legal profession published during the
last twenty-five years. This has been a period of great change and improvement in
court administration and procedure, in judicial organization and in legal education.
During this time a considerable number of states, by constitutional amendments,
have reorganized their judicial departments to give them unity and flexibility under
centralized administrative authority, permitting them to be operated as a unit
rather than continuing as a group of isolated, unrelated courts without provisions
for effective use of judicial manpower. During this time, the very effective office
of administrator of the courts was conceived and established for the Federal courts
and for the courts of most of the larger states. During this time also the Federal
rules of procedure, both for civil and criminal cases, were established and have
served as models for improvement of procedure in many states. Furthermore, dur-
ing this time, standards for legal education and admission to the Bar and pro-
cedure for effective disciplinary action against those who fail to comply with the
ethics of the profession have been greatly improved and strengthened. The develop-
ment of all of these improvements appears from the articles listed in this book.
Most complete lists of articles that have been written on all these subjects
and helped to bring them about, as well as suggestions for further improvements,
will be found in this book, well indexed as to subjects and authors. The book is
arranged in two parts; Part One: The Courts; and Part Two: The Lawyers. Part
One consists of seven main sections. Section I deals with Court Systems, Section
II with Court Personnel, Section III with Administration and Operation of Courts,
Section IV with Court Procedure, Section V with the Trial Process, Section VI
with the Appellate Process, and Section VII with Delay in Court. Part Two covers
Bar Organization, Education and Practice of Law. This book will be of great aid
to researchers in all fields of judicial and bar organization and administration by
furnishing ready reference to the best writing on these subjects. Mrs. Klein is
Assistant Director and 'Librarian of the Institute of Judicial Administration and,
since its founding in 1952 under the leadership of Chief Justice Arthur T. Vander-
bilt, has assembled its unique library of books and materials on the courts and the
legal profession. This book will make available to legislators, lawyers and judges
the wealth of literature of the greatest quarter century of improvement in the
Courts and the Bar that this country has ever seen.
LAURANCE M. HYDE*
*Judge, Missouri Supreme Court.
(324)
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APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND. By Delmar Karlen. New
York: New York University Press, 1963. Pp. 180. $6.00.
This book is a comparative study of the appellate court systems of England
and the United States. In July, 1961, an American team, headed by Mr. Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., and consisting of four judges, the Solicitor General, a
state attorney general, and the author, a professor of law at New York University
and now Director of the Institute of Judicial Administration, went to London
for two weeks of observation and discussion of the English method of appellate
procedure. In January, 1962, an English team, led by Lord Evershed, Master
of the Rolls, and made up of two Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, two judges of
the High Court, the Permanent Secretary to the Lord Chancellor, a barrister,
a solicitor, the editor of the Law Quarterly Review, and a director of the British
Institute of Comparative & International Law, paid a return visit, observing the
United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the New York Court of Appeals, and the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, of the New York Supreme Court. Each team briefed the other, assisted by
other judges, barristers and solicitors in England, and by other judges, lawyers,
professors, law school deans, and the president of the American Bar Foundation
in the United States. The teams engaged in mutual criticism of the respective
systems, each man reducing his critical observations to writing. This book is a
composite result of the thoughts and observations of all who took part in the
project.
Four chapters deal with the United States courts. A chapter is devoted to
each of the following English courts: the Divisional Courts, the Court of Appeal,
the Court of Criminal Appeals, the House of Lords, and the Privy Council.
These chapters describe the place of the various courts in the judicial hierarchy
of their respective countries, personnel, volume and scope of work, right of
appeal, documents on appeal, scope and nature of review, oral argument, assign-
ment of cases, the modus operandi of decision-making, conferences of judges,
opinions, publication of opinions, precedent, and finality of decisions.
In England, there are only twenty-one judges devoting full time to appellate
work, twelve on the Court of Appeal and nine in the House of Lords and Privy
Council. Other appellate work, as in the Court of Criminal Appeal and the
Divisional Courts of the High Court, is done by judges most of whose time is
spent trying cases nisi. These courts sit in panels of three to five members, at the
direction of the Lord Chief Justice, not ordinarily en banc. Most courts in the
United States sit en banc, and not in divisions or panels. Also, in the United
States more than six hundred judges are engaged exclusively in appellate work.
In England, all appellate judges are appointed by the Crown, on the recom-
mendation either of the Lord Chancellor or the Prime Minister, to hold office
during good behavior. Political considerations play a very minor role. For example,
during his long tenure as Lord Chancellor, Lord Jowitt appointed only one
member of his own party. The prestige of judicial office is so high that it is
rarely refused by a practicing barrister, no matter how successful his practice
1963]
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or how great his income. While American judges sometimes resign their offices
to re-enter private practice, such a course would be regarded as shocking in
England. Almost all English appellate judges have had previous experience as
trial judges, and before that as distinguished barristers. Barristers appearing
before appellate courts (less than 2,000 in number) are highly specialized in their
field of litigation and are specialists in the art of advocacy. Frivolous appeals
are discouraged by high costs, which are imposed on the losing party, including
his opponent's counsel fees. In America, any one of the 250,000 lawyers may
appear in any appellate court in any type of litigation. While American appellate
judges ordinarily receive less help from lawyers appearing before them than do
English judges, in the United States most appellate judges have law clerks, a
practice unknown in England.
English appellate courts specialize in particular types of cases. Only Okla-
homa and Texas follow the English system of separating criminal and civil
appeals. The English scope of review is broad, with the Court of Criminal Appeal
having power to review determinations of fact and revise sentences both up or
down.
No briefs are filed in English appellate courts, except in the House of Lords
or Privy Council, where an abbreviated paper of six or seven pages is required.
This is not an appellate brief in the sense in which that term is used in the United
States. It is intended only as a preliminary outline of the oral argument to be
made later. On the other hand, English appellate judges have the advantage of
having a carefully reasoned opinion by the trial judge, outlining the evidence,
summarizing the authorities relied upon, and the reasons for the decision.
While in the United States oral arguments are of secondary importance to
the briefs and are rigidly limited in duration, oral arguments in England are
all-important and never arbitrarily limited in extent. An oral argument may go
on for days, even weeks; they average a day and a quarter. Perhaps half the
time is spent by counsel in reading aloud what happened below, what errors are
complained of, and the authorities relied upon. Ad hoc suggestions from the
court may reduce the time, where the judges are satisfied as to a certain proposition.
If by the time appellant concludes his argument the court is not persuaded that
the decision should be reversed or modified, the court informs counsel for
respondent that it does not wish to hear from him at all, and proceeds forthwith
to deliver judgment.
In the United States nearly all decisions are reserved and rendered in
written form; in England, few decisions are reserved or written (only in the
House of Lords and Privy Council). In the Court of Appeal, each judge ex-
presses his individual views orally and extemporaneously at the close of argument.
In the Court of Criminal Appeal, a single opinion is customarily announced, also
orally and extemporaneously. Most of the time of English appellate judges is
spent in court, listening and talking, rather than writing. United States appellate
judges spend the least time in court, devoting most of their working hours to
reading, writing, and conferring with their colleagues. In England, one case
at a time is considered by the court. American judges, however, are required to
[Vol. 28
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shift their attention from one case to another, because cases are heard in batches
and several await decision at any given time.
English case law grows slowly, perhaps at the rate of three volumes a year.
Not all cases are reported (seventy-five percent of those decided by the House
of Lords and Privy Council; Court of Appeal, twenty-five percent; Court of
Criminal Appeal, ten percent). English judges do not feel free to overrule their
previous decisions, but are more free to decide cases as they feel justice demands.
They do not have the task of ferreting out similar fact patterns from the welter
of reported cases and comparing minutely these fact patterns with the one before
them. The English report only cases which announce rules of law having precedent
value; cases applying well settled principles to similar fact situations are not con-
sidered worthy of preservation in the Law Reports.
In England, statutory interpretation tends to be literal, and legislative history
is not considered. Statutes are not invalidated, for there is no written constitution
or doctrine of judicial supremacy. The appeal is an extension of the trial; in
the Court of Appeal and Court of Criminal Appeal new evidence may be taken;
questions of fact as well as of law are reviewed; and on the criminal side the
propriety as well as the legality of sentences is considered, with litigants often
appearing when the appeal is argued. Rehearings are not permitted, and, while
new trials may be granted in civil cases, new trials are prohibited in criminal
cases. If an error is found that is not harmless, there is no alternative; the accused
must be set free, notwithstanding that there is no question as to his guilt. Once a
problem is decided, relitigation is pointless, so rigid is the doctrine of precedent,
with the result that the citizen's only relief is corrective action by Parliament.
This book reveals more contrasts than similarities between the two systems,
and provokes thought as to how each system might be improved. It is one of the
Judicial Administration Series, published under the auspices of the National Con-
ference of Judicial Councils. Others in this series are: Criminal Appeals in A mer-
ica; Organizationz of Courts; Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases; Trafflc Courts;
The Selection and Tenure of Judges; Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal;
Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration; and Civil Procedure of the Trial
Court in Historical Perspective.
NoRwIN D. HousER*
*Commissioner, Missouri Supreme Court.
19631
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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. By Charles E. Rice. New York: New York University
Press, 1962. Pp. xix, 202. $6.00.
In 1958, Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for a unanimous Court in the case
of NAACP v. Alabama,3 stated,
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty"
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
embraces freedom of speech. 2
What the United States Supreme Court did in the NAACP decision was to
recognize and proclaim in unequivocal terms a freedom which had been latent
during many years of constitutional development. Nowhere in the Constitution
is freedom of association, or the right to associate, expressly mentioned. But, as
the language of the Court implies, freedom of association is nothing new. The
right to associate for the advancement of ideas has been recognized implicitly
in the past, and it has underlain important decisions which have been formally
ascribed to the application of other freedoms.
This recent recognition of and emphasis upon the "right to associate" has
resulted in several books dealing with the subject,3 including this volume by
Mr. Rice, assistant professor of law at Fordham University.
The purpose of the study, as stated by Mr. Rice,
is to examine this newly articulated freedom of association, with particular
emphasis upon the right, and sometimes the duty, of the individual to
associate, and his correlative right or duty not to associate. Only inciden-
tally, and as far as necessary to the central inquiry, will the rights and
duties of associations themselves be discussed.4
While men form various types of associations (e.g., commercial corporations and
partnerships, trade associations, and fraternal organizations), the author limits
himself to four associational situations in which the underlying norms of this
newly recognized freedom have been formulated-religious groups, associations
affecting livelihood, political parties and pressure groups, and subversive associa-
tions. Religious, political, and subversive associations were chosen by the author
because "they present most clearly the problem of freedom to associate for the
purpose of promulgating ideas, which is a central constitutional issue of our
time." Associations which directly affect the livelihood of their members are per-
tinent "because they are ones in which both the right to join and the right not
to join have been squarely and exhaustively challenged."
Two background chapters lay the groundwork for an understanding of the
deep historical and philosophical roots of the concept. Chapter one, "Juris-
1. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
2. Id. at 460.
3. ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION (1961); FELLMAN,





et al.: Book Review
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
BOOK REVIEWS
prudential Background," shows the abiding interest in the area of philosophers from
Aristotle to Rousseau. Chapter two, "American Background of Freedom of Associa-
tion," examines the conditions and institutions of these four types of associations
during pre-Revolutionary America and then the changes in attitude effected by the
Revolution and the adoption of the Constitution. A brief section discusses the
astute observations of Alexis de Tocqueville concerning various aspects of the
right to association in American society. Even in his day, de Tocqueville found
that, "In no country in the world has the principle of association been more
successfully used, or more unsparingly applied to a multitude of different objects,
than in America." 5
Professor Rice then devotes a chapter to each of the four types of associa-
tions mentioned above. Regarding freedom of religious association, he makes clear
that the right to join, and the right not to join, a religious association are con-
stitutionally inviolate. However, the right to practice the tenets of a religious
association, and to support it, are subject to reasonable regulations in the interest
of the public welfare. Further, the negative rights not to practice the tenets of a
religious association and not to support a religious association are subject to
limitations of an uncertain degree, through sumptuary laws enacting the precepts
of some religious groups where such laws are also justified on a secular ground,
and through public subvention of the activities of some religious associations.
Freedom of association as it relates to earning a livelihood presents some
very interesting and controversial questions, particularly those of compulsory
union membership and the "integrated bar." At the federal level and in many
state jurisdictions, public policy has dictated certain compulsions relative to
one's associations. Of course, there exists a clear constitutional right to join an
association which exists to facilitate access of its members to a livelihood. Never-
theless, one's mere presence in the same economic unit may subject an individual
to representation by such an association even though he does not choose to join
it. There may be imposed, in some situations, a duty to join an association which
exists to facilitate access of its members to a livelihood, and a correlative duty
not to join a competing association. However, an association to which an in-
dividual is compelled to belong, as a condition of earning a livelihood, may not
infringe upon his right of free political association by using his dues for political
purposes of which he asserts his disapproval.
Anyone who has a reasonable familiarity with American political institutions
will find little new in the author's brief treatment of the freedom to associate
in political parties and pressure groups. The major recent development in this
area has to do with the legislation involving the NAACP in various southern
states, and Mr. Rice fully discusses this litigation. A general conclusion which
might summarize this chapter is that there is a constitutional right to form,
join and support political parties and pressure groups, which right is subject
to regulations reasonably designed to insure the integrity of governmental processes.
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troversial question of freedom of association and subversive associations. The
author readily concedes that there is no constitutional freedom of subversive
association, but he talks in terms of a "reflected right of subversive association."
His own words would best summarize his views concerning this right:
Although there is a fundamental general freedom of association, there
is no constitutional freedom of subversive association. There is, however,
a reflected right of subversive association which is of a subconstitutional
order. This reflected right appears to exist only because the fundamental
guarantees of liberty in the Constitution, especially due process and the
freedoms of speech and press and from self-incrimination, prevent the
government from interfering arbitrarily with the members of subversive
groups. The government may restrict or penalize the members of sub-
versive associations, at least those which seek to overthrow the govern-
ment, in any way it sees fit, subject only to the restrictions imposed on
it by those fundamental constitutional guarantees. In dealing with sub-
versive associations and their members, therefore, the government is not
further restrained by the fundamental freedom of association. It must
be remembered, however, that the fundamental guarantees of individual
liberty which do inhibit the government in its dealings with subversive
associations and their members work genuine and substantial restraints
upon the exercise of official power. Often they are as effective in restrict-
ing the government as would be a fundamental freedom of subversive
association.6
Professor Rice is to be commended for a very readable, well-organized, and
scholarly analysis of this new, yet old, freedom of association, and the book
deserves a wide reading public.
FREDERICK C. SPIEGEL*
6. P. 177.
*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri.
[Vol. 28
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My LiFE IN COURT. By Louis Nizer. Garden City, New York: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1961. Pp. 524. $5.95.
This book, which ranks high on the lists of non-fiction best sellers, is
authored by a distinguished New York lawyer. Its subject is the account and
discussion of some extraordinary cases in which the author, by thorough prepara-
tion and skillful technique, secured victory for his clients, sometimes against
tremendous odds. The names of the parties are indicated in a number, though not
all, of the case stories presented, but there are no official case citations given,'
probably because of the fact that this book is principally destined for the lay
reader. It is, nevertheless, not only most interesting, but also most useful reading
for the lawyer, since it presents striking object lessons in the art of advocacy,
consultation outside of court, preparation for trial, and conduct of trial, especially
in the area of cross-examination. Moreover, some of the cases involve unusual
problems of law.
While the book is well written throughout, the stories at times become too
detailed and thus tiring. This probably applies to the first, otherwise highly in-
teresting, chapter entitled "Reputation," dealing with the libel litigation between
two famous literary personalities, the celebrated war-correspondent Quentin
Reynolds, author of a book on the New York Judge Leibowitz,2 and the columnist
Westbrook Pegler, known for his acrimonious way of writing. Nizer, representing
Reynolds, secured an extraordinary triumph. The jury awarded Reynolds punitive
damages against the three defendants in the total amount of $200,000, but only
one dollar compensatory damages. 3 The decision was affirmed on appeal.4 The
theory followed in certain jurisdictions, that nominal damages are not a sufficient
predicate for punitive damages and that punitive damages must stand in some
reasonable relation to compensatory damages, was not applied. Perhaps also
too detailed, though very interesting, is the chapter entitled "Honor," the
account of another libel suit in which Nizer successfully represented the plain-
tiff, Professor Friedrich Foerster, against the newspaper editor Victor F. Ridder.
Most of the case recitals in the book, however, are written without an
excess of particularization, are fluent, dramatic, and sometimes even suspenseful.
One such story is the last chapter, entitled "Proxy Battle," which renders a most
vivid, factually, as well as legally, account of an internal fight for control of
one of the leading film production enterprises, Loew's Incorporated. The contest
was for the control of the management, with the Vogel group, advised and
represented by Nizer, as the protagonist, and the Tomlinson group on the opposite
side. Since Loew's Incorporated is a Delaware Corporation, the battle took place
before the Chancellor and the Supreme Court of Delaware. The crux of the
1. The citations in the following footnotes are not from the book, but
supplied by the reviewer on the basis of his research.
2. See REYNor)s, COURTROOM (1950).
3. Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
4. 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955).
5. Foerster v. Ridder, 57 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (remittitur of award
of $100,000 to $50,000).
19631
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legal issue was the construction of a controversial clause in the firm's articles
of incorporation. Nizer persuaded the Delaware courts to adopt an interpretation
which the Tomlinson group claimed was contrary to a prior decision of the Del-
aware Supreme Court,0 and thus secured a victory of extraordinary magnitude
for the Vogel group.7
Two suits concerning alleged infringement of artistic property rights are
mentioned in the book. In one of them Nizer represented Konrad Bercovici in his
suit against Charles Chaplin, for alleged plagiarism in Chaplin's film "The Great
Dictator." The case is only incidentally referred to in the book as illustrative
of the author's theory of the important role which the rule of probability may
play in an advocate's preparation of his client's case.8 Apparently this litigation
was settled prior to judgment, as there is no full recital of the facts and law
involved. However, the other plagiarism case, forming the subject matter of the
chapter "Talent," is fully recited. The case is the suit of Maurice Baron, repre-
sented by Nizer, against Leo Feist, Inc. and other defendants for alleged copy-
right infringement in publishing and copyrighting the song "Rum and Coca-Cola,"
'which plaintiff claimed was substantially identical with a song previously copy-
righted by him. Nizer had to overcome forceful adverse expert testimony, but
he was nevertheless successful in the trial court and the decision was affirmed on
appeal.0
The chapter entitled "Divorce" contains, in addition to general discussions of
matrimonial law, the recital of three interesting cases in all of which Nizer
represented the female party. Since one of the cases involved a husband who
was a foot fetishist, it is easy to understand why the names of the parties are not
indicated. One of the cases is significantly called "War of the Roses," since it
concerned the matrimonial conflicts between Billy Rose and his second wife,
Eleanor.'0 But the most fascinating part of this chapter is the elaborate recital
of the labyrinth of matrimonial litigation between Dolores Fullman Astor and
John Jacob Astor through both the Florida and New York courts.11 The case in-
volved numerous difficult legal problems, such as the question of estoppel to
prevent a party who has secured a Mexican divorce from pleading its invalidity.
Dolores, a bride of six weeks, was successful in all phases of the procedural
battle against bitter opposition.
6. In re Chelsea Exchange Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 287, 159 Atl. 432 (Ch. 1932).
7. Tomlinson v. Loew's Inc., 134 A.2d 518 (Del. Ch. 1957), aff'd per curiam,
135 A.2d 136 (Del. 1957). See also Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 533, 134
A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957), 36 Del. Ch. 563, 136 A.2d 191 (Ch. 1957).
8. See Reader's Digest, March 1962, 195, reprinting as Help on the Witness
Stand part of Nizer's Prologue.
9. Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 173 F.2d
288 (2d Cir. 1949). See also Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
10. For parcels of this litigation see Rose v. Rose, 115 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup.
Ct. 1952); Rose v. Rose, 3 Misc.2d 753, 117 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
11. Astor v. Astor, 7 Fla. Supp. 29 (Cir Ct. 1955), rev'd in part, 89 So. 2d
645 (Fla. 1956); Astor v. Astor, 107 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist Cut. App. 1958),
reaff'd, 120 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 862 (1960); Astor v.
Astor, 6 Misc.2d 967, 160 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1957), 162 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup.
Ct. 1957), 9 Misc.2d 645, 165 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
[Vol. 28
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Only a small part of the book is devoted to negligence cases. The two
cases of this kind form the chapter entitled "Life and Limb." One is a malprac-
tice case in which Nizer secured a very advantageous settlement from the
defendant's insurer, while the other is a wrongful death case where Nizer was
similarly lucky in procuring a high settlement from the defendant railroad's in-
surer for his widow client. The settlement in both cases came after a trial in
which Nizer, by very clever advocacy, had badly weakened the adversaries' case.
What can be learned from this book is that thorough preparation of a case is
at least as important for a great advocate as brilliancy in brief writing or oral
argument. Indeed, the red line running through Nizer's successes is his pains-
taking study of even the remotest factual and legal aspects of his clients' cases.
Among the concrete hints contained in the book is the one that "where there is
no likelihood of contradiction, aimless cross-examination only produces repetition
of the harmful story, and heightens its effect." To this Nizer adds the following
epigrammatic words: "Nothing is more ungainly than a fisherman pulled into the
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